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1 
1 Introduction 
In his day, Pierre Bayle was highly regarded as a philosopher and 
thinker. His writings on religion influenced the skepticism of David Hume, 
and thinkers such as Leibniz felt compelled to respond to his positions in 
their books.1 Today, however, Pierre Bayle has fallen into relative obscurity, 
along with his theory of toleration. I hope to do my small part to rectify the 
latter misfortune in this thesis, and also to help sharpen Bayle’s theory of to-
leration so that it can be more useful for current theorists. In part two, I 
give an exposition of Bayle’s moral theory and his defense of broad religious 
toleration, while attempting to show that the defense of toleration is still 
compelling even when we don’t share all of Bayle’s suppositions. This sets 
the state for part three, where I attempt to improve Bayle’s theory by deriv-
ing a normative principle of toleration from his account of the limits of le-
gitimate toleration.  
 
                                       
1  Pierre Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23, 
"Compel Them to Come In, That My House May Be Full", ed. John Kilcullen and Chandran 
Kukathas (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2005), xii. 
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2 An Exposition of Bayle’s Moral Theory 
2.1 Introduction to Part Two 
Pierre Bayle was one of the first writers, along with John Locke and 
Benedict Spinoza, to offer a defense of broad religious toleration in the late 
17th century.  That defense, in turn, could be extended to a defense of tol-
eration of different political beliefs and practices as well. Bayle’s account is 
unique because it most directly attacks the most prominent argument 
against broad religious toleration: that of St. Augustine’s. Augustine argued, 
based on the quote from the Gospel, “Compel them to come in”, that 1) 
Christians are obligated to compel non-Christians and heretics to the orthodox 
faith, and 2) the use of violence was able to open recalcitrant individuals to 
the truth of Roman Catholicism.2 Therefore, the use of violence against here-
tics for the purpose of opening their eyes to the truth was both possible, 
permitted, and in some cases obligatory.  
Bayle takes on Augustine’s argument against toleration by use of two 
methods: he argues that on an exegetical level, Augustine’s interpretation of 
the biblical phrase is contrary to the spirit of the Gospel, and second, that 
philosophy shows us that compulsion in religious matters is neither practi-
cally useful nor morally acceptable. For the purposes of this essay, I will fo-
                                       
2  Bayle 2005, xvii. 
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cus on Bayle’s philosophical arguments against intolerance.  In the second 
part, I will attempt to show that Bayle’s arguments against intolerance still 
hold some force, even when we don’t grant all of Bayle’s assumptions re-
garding the existence of God. This will provide the context for part three, 
which attempts to derive a normative theory of what we ought to tolerate.  
2.2 The Context of Bayle’s Argument  
Bayle wrote in the 17th century, during a time in which both Protes-
tants and Catholics claimed that they had the right and obligation to perse-
cute those who did not agree with them, or who disagreed about points of 
doctrine. The main argument for intolerance was that of St. Augustine. Au-
gustine originally thought that heretical sects in Christianity ought to be tole-
rated, since true belief in religious matters cannot be forced if it is to be ge-
nuine. Since only genuine religious belief is valuable, there is no reason to 
endorse the use of persecution in religious matters. But Augustine changed 
his opinion after the Donatist persecution in 409. 
The Donatist’s were a Christian sect that held beliefs opposed to those 
of the Catholic Church. Due to many historical factors the authorities at the 
time decided to stop tolerating the Donatists and instead forced them to 
convert to Catholicism. The efficacy of their efforts convinced Augustine that 
his previous objections against intolerance were not cogent, and thus pro-
vided the context for him to write an essay justifying Roman persecution of 
the Donatist sect.  Augustine likened religious false belief to a potentially fa-
4 
tal disease: those who held false beliefs were liable to be damned to hell, 
and so it was incumbent upon good Christians to save them, much like it’s 
incumbent to save someone from a fatal sickness.3  
This leads to the issue of whether coercion is an efficacious or accept-
able method by which to spread religious Doctrine. Augustine acknowledges 
that coercion doesn’t by itself produce the beliefs that are necessary for sal-
vation; but he asserts that coercion is capable of opening heretics’ “Eyes to 
the truth".4 The threat of violence might compel people, Augustine says, into 
viewing the relative worth of the beliefs more accurately then they would 
otherwise. Augustine cites the fact that entire cities had converted back to 
Catholicism as evidence that coercion in such matters is effective.  
Augustine then argues that not only is such coercion effective, it is 
morally good. While Augustine agrees that coercion in general is not good, 
he argues that coercion in the case of true religion is acceptable since the 
motive is to save the person, on the general principle that the motive and 
the situation affect whether coercion is acceptable.  By contrast, heretical at-
tempts to coerce individuals are not permissible, since the intention behind 
them is to make the individual “sicker.” Therefore, it is permissible, effec-
tive, and morally good to coerce heretical souls into the true faith of Catholi-
cism.  
                                       
3 Bayle 2005, 293. 
4 Bayle 2005, 333 
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2.3 Bayle’s Response to the Efficacy of Coercion 
Bayle argues that the traditional justification for coercion is question-
able at best due to the empirical evidence concerning its effect. One of the 
greatest enemies of truth is the awakening of the “passions”, that is, strong 
emotions. When people are in intense fear about something, or are desirous 
of something, Bayle argues, they are not able to consider truth very care-
fully. Hence, our ordinary practice is to use judges that are not connected to 
the issue at hand at all. 
Persecution, of course, has a tendency to inflame the passions. Why 
the prospect of pain should increase the passions is relatively easy to under-
stand: people who think they are about to undergo significant amounts of 
pain are apt to be fearful.  As a result, they are not able to weigh an issue 
carefully when asked to decide between two propositions.5 This has very ob-
vious consequences for the value of persecution: if persons fear the prospect 
of being tortured, then their assent to any question put before them is not 
likely to be because they have suddenly become aware of the truth of the 
proposition.  It is probably because they have become aware of the potential 
consequences for retaining their former beliefs. If we are not willing to en-
gage in such actions when we want people to carefully consider the truth of 
non religious problems, it is unclear, at least for Bayle, why someone should 
                                       
5 Bayle 2005, 289 
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be thought a capable judge between “Catholick and Protestant" while being 
forced to deal with the possibility of punishment.6  
Augustine might reply that violence is not the only method by which to 
force people to examine their beliefs: we might force people to examine 
their beliefs by showing them that they could do well materially by switching 
their religion. Bayle replies, however, that this method is just as prone to 
violence to produce passions in the person being swayed. Bayle does not say 
that material inducements and threats of violence are never incapable of 
forcing somebody to examine their beliefs carefully and come to the truth; 
he implies that threatening punishment if someone refuses instruction about 
a certain religion might be acceptable, if we wanted people to be fully in-
formed about their religious decisions.7 So while it is theoretically possible 
for someone to be forced to examine religious propositions carefully because 
of their punishment, it is extremely unlikely. Therefore, we have strong rea-
son to doubt the efficacy of punishing or rewarding people in an effort to 
force them to truly convert to a religion. 
This argument by itself does not prove very much. Augustine and 
those like him might think that while Pierre Bayle might be right in certain 
isolated cases about the efficacy of coercion, they could argue that coercion 
works often enough to justify its use in religious matters, even if some per-
sons decide to lie about the truth during the process of coercion. Just be-
                                       
6 Bayle 2005, 139 
7 Though see section 3.1 for important caveats as to that position. 
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cause a treatment doesn’t work all the time does not mean that it’s worth-
less, as Augustine himself puts it.8 What’s needed here, then, is an argu-
ment that coercion is wrong and dangerous by itself, and not just because 
it’s ineffective.  
2.4 The Wrongness of Coercion in Religious Matters 
The heart of Bayle’s book is meant to provide just this sort of argu-
ment, in the guise of interpreting the quote from the gospel, “Compel them 
to come in.” Unlike contemporary philosophers, Bayle is not at liberty to pre-
sent an argument for respecting conscience entirely independent of the con-
text of religious teachings: doing such a thing, and arguing from strictly 
secular terms, might lead people to think that Bayle was begging the ques-
tion. So before Bayle starts setting out his argument for toleration, he needs 
to present an argument for how we ought to interpret the relevant claims at 
hand concerning religious conduct, namely, the claims that are listed in the 
Bible. If Bayle accepts a literal reading of the gospel quote “compel them to 
come in”, then he could not hope to successfully argue against intolerance.  
Bayle appeals to the principle of “Light of nature”; there are certain 
propositions that are so basic that any interpretation of Scripture and moral-
ity must be tested against them. We don’t learn these propositions by use of 
the Scripture; rather, all human beings know them through the use of the 
faculties that God gave them. Bayle includes among these “That the Whole is 
                                       
8 Compare Bayle 2005, 296. 
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greater than the Part; That if we take things equal, the reminder will be 
equal.”9 These truths, however, are not merely of a logical and metaphysical 
nature; Bayle argues that there are even some (very basic) moral truths in-
cluded among them, among which are “that ‘tis honest to be grateful to our 
Benefactors... and to act by Conscience.” As evidence that all persons who 
engage in biblical reading try to not violate some of the principles of natural 
light, Bayle demonstrates that church fathers such as “P. Valerien Magni” 
tried to show that Catholic doctrines of transubstantiation do not violate the 
principle of “The Whole is Greater than the Part”. Now, whether Valerien was 
successful in his endeavor is quite irrelevant for Bayle’s purposes; what 
Bayle is attempting to show is that it is widely accepted by all participants in 
the conversation that there are such principles and that they are accepted as 
binding upon all relevant interpretations of the Bible. In this matter, Bayle is 
successful: most persons will not admit that their religious doctrines contra-
dict reason, but will instead insist that their doctrines are at least internally 
consistent, provided that they are understood in the right way.  
 One of these basic principles is “That all literal Construction, which 
carries an Obligation of committing Iniquity, is false."10 Biblical interpreta-
tion, in other words, can never lead to a place that violates the morality that 
is given by “natural light”. Thus, if the literal “interpretation” of “compel 
them to come in” does result in morally pernicious consequences according 
                                       
9 Bayle 2005, 73. 
10 Bayle 2005, 66. 
9 
to the doctrines of natural light, then Bayle can conclude that the interpreta-
tion is incorrect, thus not warranted by the Bible, and thus immoral to put 
into practice. Bayle can thus proceed with his argument on purely philoso-
phical terms, and try to construct an argument against intolerance and com-
pulsion, based purely on the inherent wrongness of compulsion. 
2.5 Why Conscience Matters 
Turning our eyes back to his discussion of natural light, we should note 
that Bayle argues that according to natural light, we find that “there is a Be-
ing soverignly perfect, who rules over all things, who ought to be ador’d by 
Mankind”, and that we may also conclude that only certain forms of conduct 
and worship are pleasing to that God, much as in the same way an earthly 
king is pleased only by the real bowing of his subjects, and not by a puppet 
or a machine pretending to bow before him.11  
Bayle’s doctrine that what counts in terms of worship of God bears a 
strong resemblance to Kant’s conception of the good will being the only 
thing that matters in morality. Kant argues that the essence of moral action 
is that the person who engages in the action does so out of a good and uni-
versalizable will: that the action has good consequences or produces certain 
physical reactions in the world, does not count towards the appraisal of the 
                                       
11 Bayle 2005, 76 
10 
action.12  Bayle makes a similar move in putting right action in terms of in-
ternal decisions, rather than external consequences; but he differs from Kant 
in that he locates the source of good action not in terms of a universalizable 
categorical imperative, but in terms of “conscience”. From the principles of 
natural light, Bayle believes we know that when we judge an action to be 
“good or bad”, we do so, (provided that we are not atheists) on the principle 
that this “Rule and law is founded in the Nature of God”.13 Thus, the fact 
that a proposition is wrong entails that it must offend God. This leads Bayle 
to conclude that if we willfully commit an evil action, we must willfully “of-
fend and disobey God.” If we think we are committing an evil action, then 
we must think we are willfully offending and disobeying God. But if we think 
we are willfully offending and disobeying God, that entails that we are will-
fully offending God. 14 Thus, Bayle concludes that acting against our con-
science (what we think is right or wrong), itself entails acting badly. Even if 
the consequences turn out to be innocuous, the action is evil. 
While Bayle’s written argument hinges on the presence of god, we can 
see the force of it by thinking about praiseworthy and blameworthy actions. 
If someone commits an action that they think is wrong and vicious, even 
though it isn’t, we are inclined to blame them for such an action, even if the 
                                       
12 Compare Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: On a Supposed Right 
to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns, trans. James W. Ellington (Indiananopolis, 
Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 1993), 15. 
13 Bayle 2005, 220 
14 Compare John Kilcullen, Sincerity and Truth: Essays on Arnauld, Bayle, and Toleration 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) 68. 
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consequences of the action are neutral. For example, suppose that someone 
pushed a button because she thought it was supposed to destroy an entire 
city, but instead made a thousand kittens happy. Suppose also that she 
thought that committing such an action was wrong. In this case, this person 
would be blameworthy for the intention behind her action, even if her action 
wasn’t objectively wrong after all. The next step in the argument is to shift 
our attention from the specific intent of the person, to the general intent of 
doing something wrong knowingly. If a person thinks she is doing wrong in 
Xing and continues to X, then it is fairly intuitive that she is not praiseworthy 
for doing X even if the action is normally considered right (under whatever 
theory).   
Thus, Bayle’s argument for the importance of doing things according to 
conscience does not need to rest on thinking that there is a God who judges 
our interior judgments: our ordinary judgments can suffice for teaching us 
that acting against our conscience, or what we think to be right, entails that 
we commit a somewhat blameworthy action. For the modified Baylean the-
ory, an action can only be good if and only if we act according to our con-
science on the matter. However, Bayle does not assert (nor does he need to) 
that acting according to what you think is right is sufficient for right action. 
As Kilcullen puts it, Bayle can be thought of distinguishing between what 
makes an action good, and what makes an action right: an action is poten-
12 
tially good without being right.15  Whether it is right or not, for Bayle, de-
pends on the actual moral law that God gives (or in a secular interpretation, 
whatever system of morality happens be best), and on whether we act ac-
cording to our conscience on the matter. We act rightly, then, if and only we 
act in a good fashion according to our conscience and our actions actually 
accord with the morality that God sets above us. In any system of morality, 
if we want people to act rightly or with goodness, then we cannot expect 
them to act against what they think is right: instead, we must change what 
they think is right or wrong, through the use of rational persuasion. 
2.6 The Relationship between Conscience and Toleration 
Bayle argues that since an action that is done against conscience is 
bad, all persons have an obligation to themselves and to God to follow their 
conscience, even if their conscience happens to be incorrect as to the actual 
facts (moral or otherwise). In making this case, Bayle gives the case of a 
woman who sleeps with a man that she mistakenly believes is her husband, 
returned from a long trip.16 Bayle argues that the woman in this case is obli-
gated to sleep with the imposter if she is under the impression that the im-
poster is her lawful husband.17 Of course, that does not excuse the imposter 
for pretending that he is her husband: he ought to be punished, since he is 
committing a sin. But she would be doing a wrong if she refused to sleep 
                                       
15 Kilcullen 1988, 70 
16 Bayle 2005, 234 
17 It should be obvious that we can understand Bayle’s example without endorsing Bayle’s 
view of male-female relationships 
13 
with him, according to Bayle, since she would be committing an action that 
she thinks is wrong, and committing an action that one thinks is wrong is in-
sulting God, and is thus itself wrong. Bayle is not saying that the housewife 
merely feels like she is obligated to sleep with the husband, for that would 
be a tautology. Bayle is committed to the harder claim that the wife would 
be committing a wrong in not following her conscience, even if her con-
science was misinformed on the matter.18 She is still obligated to follow her 
conscience, in order not to be committing a wrong action.19 In order for 
them to not be under a different obligation, their conscience (or what they 
think is the right thing to do, which amounts to the same thing) must be 
changed by rational persuasion. They have an obligation to act on their con-
science, according to Bayle, even if their conscience is in error. 
How does the fact that an erring conscience binds bear on tolerance? 
The reason Bayle attempts to bring out the importance of how conscience 
binds is that the traditional case for religious intolerance rested on the pre-
supposition that the fact that Christians (either Protestants or Catholics, de-
pending on who was doing the persecuting) had the truth on their side ren-
dered their persecution of heathens acceptable.  As Augustine’s case put it, 
Catholics had the right to persecute heathens because they were making the 
                                       
18 See Bayle 2005, 220-221 “In like manner this Proposition is evident, That whoever does a 
thing which his Conscience tells him is evil, or omits that which his Conscience tells him he 
ought to do, commits a Sin.” 
19 This does not mean that the wife would be committing a right action if she slept with the 
imposter, however. She would be committing, as put above in section 2.5, a good but 
wrong action. However, if she refused to sleep with the imposter, she would be committing 
a bad and wrongful action. 
14 
heathens better, and because possessing the truth licenses certain efforts 
that would not be permitted those who did not hold the truth (hence hea-
then oppression of Christians was not acceptable, but Christian oppression of 
heathens was).  
If Bayle’s theory is correct, however, Christians would no longer be 
able to say that they are justified in persecuting heathens because they are 
in possession of the truth, while heathens are not. Rather, if Christian perse-
cution were acceptable, it would be because persecution would always be 
acceptable, no matter who does it, so long as it is in accord with the actor’s 
conscience. Bayle’s argument goes like this: when a conscience binds, it 
binds regardless of the veracity of the conscience. Let us suppose that it is 
an accepted moral law that those who hold correct religious opinions are 
morally permitted to coerce others into believing the correct religious opinion 
through the use of force. The problem is that this moral right for the correct 
religious doctrine to coerce others will also become a moral right for those 
who have false opinions about religion, because they will be under the im-
pression that their beliefs are true, making it right for them to coerce.  It 
would thus be good, and obligatory, for everyone to coerce everybody else 
into religion against conscience, no matter whether the religion be true or 
false. The fact that makes it obligatory for persons to act in a certain way is 
not the truth: it is the fact that they think they have the truth. 
15 
Most people, of course, will not accept the idea that a world in which 
everybody is able to coerce one another into a different religion is one that is 
to be counted morally better than one in which the so called “right religion” 
is able to coerce (morally). But there is no world, for Bayle, in which it can 
be morally good for the correct religion to persecute, while morally bad for 
other religions to persecute: for everyone who thinks they are in the correct 
religion would also have be good in persecuting those they consider hea-
thens. Thus, in order to coherently say that not everybody has the right to 
coerce persons into different religion, we must say that no one has the right 
to coerce people into religious faith.20 
An objection to Bayle’s argument might be to bite the bullet, and say 
provided you really do think that it is right to force others into your religion, 
then it really is good for you to coerce others into it: in fact, it is good for 
every particular sect to try to violently coerce others into their preferred re-
ligion, so long as they sincerely think that it is right. Thus, the fact that co-
ercion on the part of one religion entails coercion on the parts of all religion 
would do nothing to entail the wrongness of the reaction of the action.  
There are two ways that Bayle could get out of this trap. Bayle agrees 
that whether the action is good or not is dependent on whether you believe 
your action to be right.  He can, nonetheless, consistently deny that thinking 
an action is right makes it right. It might be the case that everyone’s action 
                                       
20 Bayle would add a condition allowing religious faiths cannot unacceptably physically en-
danger nonbelievers.  For more details on this condition, see section 2.0. 
 
16 
would end up being good, but wrong. The necessary analysis of wrongness 
might entail some sort of deontological or consequentialist framework, but 
Bayle could say that while it is conceivable for everybody in the world to be 
committing a good action by coercing others into the correct religion, it is 
not conceivable for them to be committing a right one. 
Another route that Bayle could use to rebut this objection is to it is de-
ny the possibility of an intolerant or persecuting act being good, because the 
criteria of universalizability will also work to undermine the possibility of an 
act of intolerance being considered good. Bayle offers us a method by which 
to consider whether we could consider endorsing a certain political practice, 
by asking whether we would recommend its adoption by a foreign country. 
He also asks his audience to consider if Christians could expect the Chinese 
to take in missionaries, considering the practice of Christian missionaries.21 
In short, all of the reflections seem to point to an implicit premise: we are 
incapable of considering a given practice right, or mandated by conscience, 
when presented with evidence that it could not be adopted universally. But a 
necessary condition of an action being good, on Bayle’s view, is that the 
person who commits the action thinks the action is right. Therefore, if an 
argument is given that to any person P that successfully demonstrates a 
given action X to be wrong, or at least shows that we cannot be confident 
                                       
21 See Bayle 2005, 93  
17 
confident that X is right, then the action X as committed by P cannot be con-
sidered right by P, and thus cannot be good.22  
Bayle has evidence that, more often than not, when faced with an ac-
cusation that an action is not universilazable, persons are incapable of think-
ing that it is good. The common reaction, when persons are told that an ac-
tion that they perform could not be universalized or would be ridiculous if it 
were, is to try to try to deny the claim, suggesting there is some property of 
the action that makes it special (for example, only true doctrines get the 
benefit of coercion).  Alternatively, someone might deny that universaliza-
tion has any bearing on whether an action is moral or not. In the case of co-
ercion in religious matters, the first of these options is rendered improbable 
by Bayle’s fallibilism: we cannot insist that only true doctrines have the right 
to coerce, since that assumes we know these matters fully in the first 
place.23 The second option would also be unappetizing for Bayle’s contempo-
raries (and perhaps, for most philosophers), for the basis of the urge to co-
erce was a universalizing urge. That is, those seeking to use coercion 
thought it true that it would be best for everyone if they accepted the relig-
ion in question.  Thus, Bayle could be relatively at ease about the impor-
tance of universalism as a component for evaluation of action. In addition, 
the mere presence of Bayle’s book, and the arguments against the rightness 
                                       
22 At the very least, they must truthfully reckon with the possibility that they could be mis-
taken. See Section 3.6 for more discussion on the epistemological duties that Bayle’s moral 
theory implies. 
23 Compare Kilcullen 1988, 86. 
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of tolerance, makes it less likely that any such actions of intolerance can 
even be considered good, let alone right. Remember that an action is only 
good for Bayle if the person who does the action thinks that the action is 
right. But if a compelling argument is put forth that questions the rightness 
of the action, then the responsible agent’s belief in the rightness of the ac-
tion must be questioned. If the agent cannot fully believe the action to be 
right (or deliberately limits her investigation into whether the action is right) 
then the agent cannot be said to be committing even a good action. After 
the publication of his book, Bayle could argue that intolerant actions may not 
be able to be considered good—at least not without further argument.  
We should take pains to realize that what Bayle is proposing here is 
not a mere modus vivendi like Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes, in the Leviathan, 
argued that warring groups should not coerce each other because the costs 
of warfare was too high for any individual to rationally bear.  He believed 
that if the individuals, or groups, in the state of nature could be assured that 
they win the fight, than they would have no motivation or reason to honor 
the peace. Because of the expense of warfare, though, individuals in modus 
vivendi situation agree to not interfere with each other’s situation, and to es-
tablish a sovereign to ensure the peace (which may not be the same as tol-
erating each other). However, Bayle assumes that people will continue to 
care very deeply about their religions, and that they will have legitimate ob-
jections to the religious practice of others.  Bayle is giving an argument that 
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people ought to not interfere with certain behavior because interference 
would be morally wrong, not because it would lead to unpleasant conse-
quences for the people who interfered. Tolerators in Bayle’s theory have a 
reason for not interfering with the behavior of others. 
2.7 The Cost of intolerance In Politics 
Of course, those who argue for intolerance may try a different tack. 
Instead of just arguing that those who have the true religion are allowed to 
persecute others because they hold the truth, those who follow in Augus-
tine’s footsteps may argue that tolerating different religious sects may 
“throw the State into all kinds of Confusion”.24 Plurality of religions in any 
one state, in this argument, lead to unrest and lack of stability. A plurality of 
religions “sets Neighbor at variance with his Neighbor, father against Son”, 
because the different religions involved will have different standards of the 
good, and all will attempt to take over the powers of the state in order to 
repress others. In order to avoid such confusion, the state must therefore 
endorse and set one religion over the others, even forcibly repressing them. 
This is not an uncommon doctrine among early modern philosophers. Rous-
seau also thought that in the ideal state there should be an official “civil re-
ligion” that all citizens must endorse, as a condition of being part of the 
state, on the basis that “wherever theological intolerance is allowed, it is im-
                                       
24 Bayle 2005, 199. 
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possible for it not to have some civil effect."25 Given incompatibility of plural 
religions and stable government, then advocates of intolerance might be 
able to argue that intolerance is morally permissible, since an official state 
religion is a necessary component of a good and stable state. 26 
Bayle takes the potential danger of religious disagreement seriously, 
but he denies that the cause of the danger is the fact that governments be-
come too tolerant. Rather, he attributes the danger to the fact that different 
religions “endeavor… to crush and destroy the other by methods of Persecu-
tion."27 Religions and persons believe in a zero-sum world, in which the win-
ning religion gets the ability to coerce the others using the power of the 
state. But working from this fact is misidentifying the problem; if we instead 
changed the rules so that religions did not have the power to coerce others 
(or declined to because they thought coercion in such matters was a grave 
moral wrong), then we would not see instability in such matters. Instead, 
each religion, in Bayle’s words, would endeavor to outdo each other by their 
“Zeal in the practice of Vertue”, and strive to show that their own religion 
was the more virtuous. The religions in question would compete for the fa-
vors of God in a way that benefits everyone in the society, much like the 
presence of different tradesmen in the society does not mean that the com-
                                       
25 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, ed. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 150-151. 
26 Obviously, this argument would not go through if we took an anarchist position on the 
virtues of the state. For the moment, we are assuming that states in theory can be both 
justified and legitimate.  
27 Bayle 2005, 200 
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petitors are forced to fight each other to the death. Since there is no neces-
sary connection between the plurality of religious opinion and the violence 
that undermines the state, we can thus attribute the problem purely to the 
practices of intolerant religions.  Moreover, those who advocate intolerance 
are not only the source of instability, but are also responsible for the crimes 
that attend state-endorsed policies of intolerance. When a prince gives an 
order, according to Bayle, he is responsible not only for the explicit acts that 
the order endorses, but also for the foreseeable actions that arise from the 
way the order is carried out. For example, if an officer is given an order to 
interrogate all evildoers who enter into a kingdom, he is likely to use what 
are, on his judgment, the means necessary to complete that end. 28 If the 
order is badly formulated, or the king could have the reasonable presupposi-
tion that such an order will result in crimes, then the king is morally respon-
sible for all the officer does that could be reasonably foreseen. Of course, 
there are limits; Bayle would not say that the king is responsible for utterly 
irrational and unreasonable interpretations of the order. If the officer de-
cided to interrogate all birds that entered into the kingdom because the offi-
cer was under the supposition that all birds were necessarily evildoers, the 
king could not be blamed for that, provided the king had no idea of the offi-
cer’s irrational beliefs.29 
                                       
28 See Kilcullen 1988, 74. 
29 However, if after having found out about the bird situation, the king neglected to either 
change the order or remove the officer, then the king would be blameworthy. But then he 
22 
People who advocate intolerance, Bayle thinks, must necessarily advo-
cate the foreseeable evils that come with it, because they are entailed by in-
tolerance. Intolerance, during Bayle’s time, routinely included brutal acts of 
violence such as punishment by “fire, Banishment, Dungeons, and quarter-
ing of Soldiers”. All of these acts are inherently immoral. The fact that coer-
cion in religious matters leads to such actions therefore makes the practice 
of religious intolerance morally problematic. Since it is foreseeable that the 
order to not tolerate will result in widespread crimes, the order to not toler-
ate (reasonable) dissenting religions is immoral.  
The response, of course, could be that coercion in religious matters 
does not entail such extreme actions: instead, punishment for being in the 
wrong religion could be relatively light, such as merely imposing fines. Thus, 
a state could still reap the benefits of a supposed intolerant policy, while 
keeping its hands free of the intrinsically bad deeds such as burning by the 
stake, and what not. Now, as discussed later, Pierre Bayle does not neces-
sarily object to lighter burdens against certain religions, provided they keep 
within certain bounds.30 However, those burdens are meant to serve a much 
less comprehensive purpose than the ones that are proposed by those Bayle 
considers intolerant--conversion of all heretics.  Furthermore, the propo-
nents of such policies don’t usually recognize any inherent limit to how they 
                                                                                                                           
would be blameworthy for not correcting his mistake, and all subsequent actions of the offi-
cer, not the initial acts of the officer engaging in unreasonable interpretations of the order.  
30 See my discussion of the type of instruction a king may impose, in the second section of 
this paper. 
23 
may accomplish this goal. Thus, the tendency is to push towards more and 
more “effective” methods, when the old gentle methods don’t work, or are 
shown to be less effective than the brutal ones. After all, if some fear works 
wonders in making men listen more easily to the reason, why not add more 
fear and pain to make it go even quicker?31 Since the only purpose of the 
coercion is to maximize the amount of conversions to the one true religion, 
there doesn’t seem to be a natural stopping point for coercion into different 
religions. While it may be theoretically possible for someone to advocate 
stopping at some point, it turns out in practice that once you admit that it is 
permissible to coerce others into accepting a religion, people start finding all 
sorts of reasons to have more and more extensive punishment (as evi-
denced by the example of France and Spain). The institution of coercion 
seems to provide its own justification for more and more brutality.32  Thus, 
there are good institutional reasons not to start down the path of religious 
coercion: when we look at the moral costs honestly, no moral person can 
endorse the logical conclusion. 
2.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined some of the arguments that Bayle uses 
to establish the wrongness of religious intolerance. First, the efficacy of re-
ligious intolerance in persuading others to convert to the true religion can 
                                       
31 Compare Bayle 2005,165 
32 For a similar argument on the issue of torture, see David Luban, "Liberalism, Torture, and 
the Ticking Bomb," in Arguing about Political Philosophy, ed. Matt Zwolinski, 647-663 (New 
York: Routledge, 2009). 
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never be firmly established and we can assumed to it is ineffective. Second, 
and more importantly for Bayle, religious intolerance is intrinsically bad be-
cause it a) always implies the repression of conscience which is necessary 
for good action, b) cannot be willed to be a universal practice, as binding on 
all persons and sects, and c) as an institution, leads to even worse crimes. If 
I have done my job right, I have hopefully made some of Bayle’s arguments 
plausible, and have sufficiently sketched out Bayle’s general moral theory. In 
the next chapter, I will proceed to derive a normative principle of toleration 
from Bayle. 
3 A Baylean Principle of Toleration 
Bayle argues that because of the unique role that conscience plays, we 
cannot assume that holding true opinions (about religion) gives us the right 
to persecute those who do not hold true opinions. We must grant that if we 
think we have the obligation (and right) to persecute those who hold false 
opinions, then those who hold false opinions may think they are obligated 
(and have the right) to persecute us. In order to avoid this conclusion, we 
must say that we are obligated to tolerate differences in religious opinion. 
This argument for religious toleration can also be extended to belief and 
practices that are not religious in nature.  
  While Bayle offers a coherent account of why we are obligated 
to tolerate, he is not nearly as clear as to what we should tolerate. Bayle of-
25 
fers tokens of proper instances of toleration, but he only gestures at a nor-
mative principle of toleration; nor does he give a strict definition of the con-
cept of toleration. In this paper, I intend to draw out a Baylean normative 
principle of toleration and see whether it can plausibly play a role in deciding 
what we may and may not tolerate. This will entail uncovering both (1) 
Bayle’s conception of toleration and (2) a Baylean normative principle of tol-
eration. In discussing these, I show that Bayle’s conception of toleration im-
portantly differs from contemporary theories. In addition, I also attempt to 
make Bayle’s normative principle of toleration at least prima facie compel-
ling; I do not intend to argue that the Baylean principle is better than a 
competing normative principle of toleration: only that it is conceptually co-
herent.  
3.1 What can (and must) be tolerated according to Bayle 
Bayle offers a defense of toleration that relies on the premise that the 
only conduct which can be considered good, as Kilcullen puts it, is that con-
duct which is done according to a person’s conscience.33 Conduct that does 
not follow from a person’s conscience does not deserve praise, even if the 
action performed would be otherwise praiseworthy. However, just because 
an action is done according to conscience does not imply that we should tol-
erate it.  It might be good (in this sense) for the sincere murderer to mur-
                                       
33 See Killcullen 1988, 71. Note that Bayle differentiates between an actions being good and 
an action being right. Acting on your conscience is a necessary condition for your action be-
ing right, not a sufficient one. But acting on your conscience is a sufficient condition for it 
being good.  
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der, but we are not obligated to tolerate her murderous ways.34 Respect for 
conscience has limits.  
Bayle tells us that nearly all opinions about religious doctrines may be 
tolerated; states and religious groups are obligated to tolerate Jews, Mus-
lims, and even Pagans, though not Catholics and Atheists.35 The reason that 
Bayle gives for not tolerating Catholics and Atheists, however, is not tied to 
the intrinsic wrongness of their beliefs; rather, it is because of a perceived 
danger to the wider society. Catholics, Bayle thought, are too tied by obliga-
tion to the Roman Catholic Church, and to the practices of forcing belief to 
be allowed positions of power.36 However, Bayle’s view is that provided 
Catholics are willing to keep their divisive opinions to themselves, there is no 
justification for oppressing them in any way.37  The mere fact that they hold 
the opinion only justifies suspicion, not banishment. In addition, Bayle 
claims, since atheists are not capable of swearing the oaths that are neces-
sary for the maintenance of society, it is permissible not to tolerate them.38  
Jews, Muslims, and Pagans, however, do not suffer from these objec-
tions. Those who are prepared to tolerate the beliefs of others and who do 
not resort to objectionable methods for spreading their religion ought to be 
                                       
34 Remember, a good action is not necessarily a right action; some may even be wrong. 
35 Bayle 2005, 211. 
36 Though Bayle does say that Catholics may be tolerated if they foreswear obedience to the 
pope. Whether they could do so while remaining Catholic is a question he does not consider. 
37 Bayle 2005, 191 
38 Bayle 2005, 243. 
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allowed to practice their religion.39  Sects that do not practice toleration 
ought not to be tolerated, since they are a) committing a practice that is 
morally wrong, and b) might endanger the safety of the state. This leaves, 
of course, most groups being tolerated.  Bayle’s emphasis, however, is on 
the individuals (and, as we saw above, their consciences).  Hence, while he 
would have us tolerate many groups of believers, he would also have us tol-
erate those who decide to depart from religious groups. Bayle does not envi-
sion a regime like the Ottoman Empire, in which different religions are toler-
ated, but no dissension or novelty from the originating religions are tolerated 
either by the government or by the originating sects.40 In this sort of sce-
nario, only already established groups would be tolerated and individuals 
would not be allowed to found new religious groups. A Baylean regime of to-
leration would be much more tolerant of individual beliefs.  In fact, Bayle 
says we are obligated to permit “innovations in religion,” thus mandating the 
state step in to prevent religions from persecuting dissenters, unlike the Ot-
toman Empire regime.41 So while Bayle’s Commentary concerns itself pri-
marily with the problem of group toleration, Bayle does not make the subse-
quent step of thinking that it is primarily groups that need to be tolerated. 
Bayle is concerned with the practice of tolerating the individuals who make 
up the groups, not just tolerating the existence of different groups. 
                                       
39 Bayle 2005, 214. 
40 See Will Kymlicka, "Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance," in Toleration: An Elusive 
Virtue, ed. David Heyd, 81-105 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
41 Bayle 2005, 201. 
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 While Bayle does not explicitly tell us that we ought to tolerate 
different religious practices as well as different religious beliefs, he is implic-
itly committed to that as well. Among the things to be tolerated are parents 
raising their children with a (perhaps religious) belief set that they choose 
and people worshipping at home, both of which imply rather robust ideas 
about the range of acceptable conduct.42  Bayle’s tolerance of Jews and Mus-
lims also entails tolerating different modes of conduct, since being Jewish or 
Muslim in Bayle’s day required eating different foods and adhering to differ-
ent norms of conduct.  
However, Bayle does not think that we are required to permit the con-
struction of public places of worship, or to permit processions in the street, 
as these are not essential to freedom of religion.43 The word “public” in this 
context is ambiguous: Does Bayle intend to say that we are not obligated to 
use public funds to build places of worship, or that we are not obligated to 
tolerate the building of public temples in the sense of being out in the open 
for everyone to see? The first sense would be fairly innocuous; many liberals 
would agree that we are not obligated to give public funds to every religious 
sect that wants them.  In fact, many modern day liberals might even go so 
far as to say that we are required not to use public funds to build places of 
worship, since that would be a violation of the doctrine of the neutral state, 
                                       
42 Bayle 2005, 191 
43 Compare Bayle 2005, 140 
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that is, one that endeavors not to endorse one view or another in public con-
flict.44 
I think Bayle probably intended to say that we are not obligated to let 
sects build temples at all, rather that just indicating that we are not obli-
gated to fund them. It would fit the below reading of Bayle’s principle of tol-
eration, which does not make non-interference the standard by which we 
measure toleration. The more limited reading of toleration would also cohere 
with Bayle’s non-endorsement of the fully neutral state. (Though Bayle is 
very progressive for his day, we should take pains to distinguish his position 
from John Stuart Mill’s position, for example.) 
3.2 Bayle’s Conception of Toleration 
While Bayle praises toleration, and gives limits for what we may toler-
ate, he is not careful to tell us what toleration requires conceptually. How-
ever, we can develop Bayle’s conception of toleration through comparison 
with our own. Bayle accepts what Rainer Forst calls the “objection, accep-
tance, and rejection” requirements for toleration; Bayle thinks that toleration 
entails objecting to some practice or belief, but accepting that there is some 
reason to accept its practice.45 The main difference between Bayle’s concep-
tion of toleration and a contemporary conception of toleration is that Bayle 
does not think that tolerating an action entails non-interference. As seen 
                                       
44 However, Kymlicka might disagree. 
45 Rainer Forst, "Pierre Bayle's Reflexive Theory of Toleration," in Toleration and its Limits, 
ed. Melissa S. Williams and Jeremy Waldron, 78-113 (New York: New York University Press, 
2008). 
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above, Bayle also thinks that toleration means allowing the propagation of 
differing beliefs and the education of children in them, but not necessarily 
accepting the right of individuals to either build public churches or parade in 
the streets. Toleration for Bayle also doesn’t entail that the sovereign refrain 
from taking a position on religious matters; the sovereign might justifiably 
require that everyone becomes educated with some of the major doctrines 
of the sovereign’s own religion.46 
However, toleration and respect for other persons’ rights of conscience 
requires that we do not make adhering to a given belief set P impossibly 
burdensome, due to financial restrictions, rewards, or punishments.47 Doing 
any of these would give the person incentive to violate their conscience; and 
any action that is intended to corrupt a person’s conscience is one that is 
morally blameworthy since abiding by one’s own conscience is required for 
an act to be good. But we might be permitted to impose some costs, such as 
prohibiting the construction of public churches (see above) or requiring some 
religious education in the sovereign’s chosen religion.48 Accordingly, what 
counts as toleration for Bayle seems to be something like: 
Tb: A principled refraining from imposing excessive costs and/or 
rewards on a person’s beliefs or actions, despite the beliefs or 
actions being thought objectionable.49  
  
                                       
46 Bayle 2005, 142 
47 Bayle 2005, 139. 
48 Though Bayle’s idea of what sort of education the sovereign may impose is very thin.  
49 For a contemporary definition of tolerance see Andrew Jason Cohen, "What Toleration Is," 
Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy, 2004: 68-95.  
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By comparison, a modern formulation of tolerance would be something 
like: 
T: A principled act of non-interference against certain conduct, 
beliefs, or persons, despite the conduct being found objection-
able. 
  
What determines whether a cost is excessive in Tb is dependent on the 
context.  For example, whether an individual is antecedently impoverished 
might determine whether the costs imposed on her for remaining in a differ-
ent religion violates the doctrine of toleration. It is conceptually possible that 
if receiving instruction in another religion is too costly for some individual, 
the sovereign cannot simultaneously tolerate her and impose such instruc-
tion on her, even though Bayle says the sovereign is entitled to impose such 
instruction.50 We might imagine that some individuals are so fearful that the 
very idea that the sovereign leans one way rather than another in terms of 
religion might impermissibly tempt them to abandon their consciences. Such 
individuals would be very rare, and Bayle might think that there are no such 
individuals that exist in this world; thus, as a matter of contingent fact, sov-
ereigns remain entitled to impose such instruction while still being consid-
ered tolerant. But if Bayle’s conception of toleration is to remain consistent, 
there may be some theoretical point at which the sovereign may not impose 
instruction. Excessive costs, and what toleration demands of us, must be 
                                       
50 Bayle 2005, 207. 
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considered context-sensitive, liable to change depending on the political, in-
dividual, and social conditions.  
3.3 A Initial Formulation of the Baylean Toleration Principle 
Having defined Bayle’s conception of toleration, we can now move on 
to the process of defining the normative limit of toleration. A preliminary 
reading of Bayle suggests that the one reason we have to interfere with ac-
tions done in accord with one’s conscience is to protect the stability of soci-
ety. I call this first formulation of the principle, A. 
 
A: The sovereign (or other governing authority) is permitted to 
not tolerate only such actions and/or creeds that she thinks in-
terferes with the stability of society.51 
 
Such a principle would capture the main thrust of Bayle’s toleration ar-
gument. Judges and sovereigns should not judge the truth of beliefs, but 
whether the beliefs threaten the stability of society. 52 While the criterion of 
good action, according to Bayle, is acting according to your conscience, the 
judge is not required to take that into account; indeed, in some cases the 
                                       
51 A reader of this paper has asked me what exactly the sovereign is entitled to do when she 
is permitted to not tolerate a creed. I point to section 3.1 for the beginning of an answer, 
where I cite Bayle’s discussion of how to deal with Catholics. Catholics who are loyal to the 
Pope may be justifiably exiled but may not be harassed in the private sphere, on account of 
“this being the Part and Office of a tempting Demon”.  For Bayle, being properly intolerant 
of a creed does not entail that all limits are off in terms of punishment: but Bayle does not 
include, and I can not include here, a full explanation of all the proper methods that a state 
may seek to manipulate its citizens. Section 2.7 also includes Bayle’s discussion of intrinsi-
cally bad political persecutions  that I shall also assume that any legitimate sovereign is not 
entitled to use. See Bayle 2005, 191. 
52 Compare Bayle 2005, 246. 
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judge may be obligated to ignore the fact that you were acting according to 
your conscience!53  
At this point, some would be satisfied with this account of the norma-
tive principle of tolerance for Bayle. After all, this principle is one that Bayle 
explicitly endorsed: 
That Soverigns, having an essential and unalienable Right of en-
acting laws for the Preservation of the State and Society over 
which they are plac’d, may ordain, that all, without distinction, 
who endanger the Public Peace by Doctrines tending to Sedition, 
Rapine, Murder, Perjury &c. be punish’d according to the Nature 
of their Crimes.54 
 
This passage provides prima facie reason to believe that we should 
read Bayle as endorsing this principle. It also has the virtue of fitting in 
neatly with Bayle’s previous statements about how the sovereign is not enti-
tled (nor capable) of judging the truth of certain beliefs, at least in the role 
of being a sovereign. The investigation about which crimes may be justifiably 
prohibited under A is relatively simple, since the consensus about which ac-
tions and beliefs tend to undermine the “Public Peace” would be much great-
er than consensus about which beliefs are in themselves objectionable.  In 
addition, most would agree the sovereign has an interest and an obligation 
in preserving the stability of a society.  
                                       
53 For example, the sincere murderer might believe that it was her duty to murder her chil-
dren because she thinks overpopulation is a grave problem. Bayle would say that a judge 
would be required not to excuse her action, even though it was in a certain sense good. 
54 Bayle 2005, 190 
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3.4 Which Societies deserve to be protected? 
However, principle A is not sufficient. While Bayle is concerned with 
the stability of society, he must have criteria about the worthiness of the so-
ciety itself. If a society is stable but represses conscience routinely, it is 
doubtful that Bayle would say that we should wish to see its stability sup-
ported. Rational persuasion against the tenets of Nazi Germany might plau-
sibly be held to undermine the stability of society under such a regime, but 
that would not render the action of the Nazi governments in interfering with 
rational persuasion right, for two different reasons. One, we might think, 
with H.L.A Hart, that a wicked society does not have a right to defend it-
self.55  Second, Bayle says we are obligated to allow those with differing 
viewpoints about religious matters an opportunity to inform us about their 
opinions.56  Since Nazi Germany would directly interfere with the ability of 
persons to test their opinions about the true religion, this would constitute 
another telling objection against allowing the stability of Nazi Germany to be 
the mark of whether an opinion should be tolerated or not. This would also 
rule out societies that force their members to subscribe to one particular re-
ligion over another as a condition for membership in the political society; so-
cieties that did this to their members might be forcing their members to re-
nege on their obligation to hear dissenting views, thus forcing their members 
                                       
55 See HLA Hart, "Law, Liberty, and Morality," in Classic Readings and Cases in the 
Philosophy of Law, ed. Susan Dimock, 411 (New York: Pearson Education, 2007).  
56 Compare Bayle 2005, 97-100 
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to commit a moral wrong.57 The banning of expression of rational persuasion 
should show that this account of a Baylean principle is flawed; we must de-
termine what type of society is permissible.  
Thankfully, Bayle actually provides us with a state of nature account of 
what type of society people would enter into. Bayle states that  
For the same Reason it’s evident, that no Body of Men, who en-
ter into Society, and deposite their Liberty in the hands of a 
Soverign, ever meant to give him a Power over their Con-
sciences: this were a Contradiction in terms: for unless we sup-
pose the Partys to the original Contract errand Ideots or mad 
Men ….Such engagements therefore [to make their progeny ad-
here to a particular religion] are null and void in themselves, and 
exceed the Power of those who make ‘em.’”58 
 
Bayle is clearly pointing towards a contract model that tells us what 
sort of society may be justified—though his account is incomplete.59 One 
reason for that incompleteness may be that Bayle is not (explicitly) con-
cerned with the legitimacy of government in this book, whereas other writers 
that use the contract model, such as John Locke, are. But Bayle is clearly 
gesturing towards the idea that there is a certain set of boundaries that so-
ciety may not overrun in the pursuit of stability.  
Bayle can be interpreted, in the passage just proffered, as saying that 
the right of conscience is inalienable; persons in the state of nature are not 
                                       
57 However, my objection here might not hold against societies that also have robust exit 
rights that people have ample opportunities to take advantage of.  
58 Bayle 2005, 163. 
59 It’s not clear, for example, whether Bayle intends for the contract to be hypothetical or 
actual. I’m inclined to read him as intending it to be hypothetical consent. This is in contrast 
to Locke who thought the consent needed was actual. 
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at liberty to give it up. However, even if we don’t agree with Bayle that the 
right of conscience is inalienable, we can think that people in the state of na-
ture would not give up their right of conscience, because the costs of doing 
so are greater than any benefits that could be gained. For example, people 
in the state of nature might refuse to give up their right of conscience be-
cause to give up their right of conscience endangers their immortal soul: if 
they act against what their conscience tells them to do, then they must be 
committing a bad act, since acting against your conscience is a necessary 
condition for acting in a good way. In more secular terms, we might argue 
that acting according to your conscience is an essential human interest; 
thus, it is almost impossible to think of situations that people would willingly 
give up their right of conscience.60   
It would be more convenient if Bayle said that we enter into society 
primarily to protect our right of conscience: however, there are many other 
things which society does for us that do not revolve around the right of con-
science, such as protection of property rights. In any event, either the inal-
ienability of the right of conscience or the central interest of the right of con-
science will deliver the conclusion that societies may not violate the right of 
conscience. 
 
                                       
60 For a contemporary argument to this effect, see Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal 
Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (New York, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). 
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3.5 The second version of the Baylean Principle of Toleration 
  
So now we need to change A to  
A2: The sovereign is permitted to not tolerate such actions 
and/or beliefs that she thinks interferes with the stability of a so-
ciety that meets the minimum standards of S. 
 
Where S stands for:  
S: A society that fully protects, among other rights, the right of 
conscience.61 
 
This formulation goes a long way towards limiting the actions of tyran-
nical societies. While the sovereign is still permitted to not tolerate such ac-
tions as she thinks “interfere” with the society, she has to subject her inter-
ference to an idealized standard in order to justify it. This would ordinarily 
exclude the possibility of a sovereign being permitted to interfere with prac-
tices that would not undermine a good society. The sovereign of Nazi Ger-
many, according to this principle, would not be able to interfere with the 
practices of a Quaker sect that advocated pacifism. Even if the actions of the 
Quaker sect created instability due to the intolerant activities of opposing 
sects, the sovereign would not be justified in repressing the Quaker sect be-
cause their actions would not have created instability in an ideal society.62 
                                       
61 The reason that I put in “among other rights” is that there might be other rights that a 
society needs to respect other than the right of conscience in order to be ideal. 
62 However, if the sovereign of a tyrannical society sincerely believed that the actions she 
was not tolerating would undermine the stability of a society S, then her actions would have 
to be considered “good” but not right. However, the way she came to have those beliefs 
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Thus, intolerant societies do not get the benefit of the doubt under the Bay-
lean standard.  
However, the question may arise as to why we don’t say  
A3: The sovereign of a society of type S is permitted to not tol-
erate such actions and/or beliefs that she thinks interfere with 
the stability of her society. 63 
 
 After all, both principles A2 and A3 try to eliminate the possibility of 
the sovereign of Nazi Germany being able to cite concerns about stability to 
justify repressive policies. A3 also has the advantage of being simpler to un-
derstand, and avoids the problem of the sovereign being under an idealized 
standard.   
A3, however, is too strong.  As formulated, A3 would not only exclude 
those societies that are perfectly tyrannical, but also those in a state of tran-
sition from being intolerant to tolerant. Suppose there was a society that 
was transitioning from being Nazi Germany to something like a liberal de-
mocracy. Let us also suppose there was an intolerant group that would have 
been justifiably not permitted (in that transitioning regime) under A2. Under 
A3, the transitional society would not be able to interfere with the actions of 
the intolerant group, since only a society that fulfilled S currently would have 
the right to not tolerate these actions. This would exclude societies that are 
in the process of changing their intolerant laws and regimes from preventing 
                                                                                                                           
would play a role in determining whether her belief could be counted as sincere, and thus 
her action good: see section 3.6 below.  
63 Thanks to Dr. Andrew Jason Cohen for raising this objection. 
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intolerant actions. For example, it would be then impermissible for post 
World War 2 Japan to prevent religious persecution, since they might have 
still been moving towards a society that fulfilled S. 64 
 In effect, only the perfectly tolerant society would have the right to 
defend itself. This might have the unfortunate effect, depending on how se-
riously we take standard S, of saying that no society that existed at the time 
Bayle had the right to defend itself. I am not prepared to say that any par-
ticular regime coincides perfectly with the standards of S; nor does it seem 
likely to conclude that Bayle thought that no society of his time possessed 
the right to defend itself.  In the absence of convincing evidence otherwise, 
we should remain with A2 in lieu of the more radical A3. 
3.6 Does it matter if we are right?  
The principles I have formulated raise the question of why we require 
the sovereign to act according to what she thinks interferes with the stability 
of the ideal society, rather than what would actually interfere with the stabil-
ity of the ideal society. Here I am keeping in line with Bayle’s normative the-
ory, in which we are not required to act in accord with the truth, but only ac-
cording to how we perceive the world around us.65 Part of Bayle’s case for 
                                       
64 A question might be raised about actions that that would not threaten the stability of the 
good society, but as a matter of fact, would increase the badness of the transitional society 
in question. If the badness that increases is the intolerance, then Bayle is quite clear that 
the real source of the badness is the intolerance itself, and so we should tolerate the action 
in question (Compare Bayle 2005, 200). However, if the badness in question is not intoler-
ance, it seems the sovereign may interfere, provided the badness in question would affect 
the other sort of rights that are covered under S.  
65 Kilcullen 1988, 60 
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toleration rests on the idea that we are obligated to act according to our 
conscience, which means we can be obligated to act in a way that follows 
from moral (or other) facts if we do not know those facts (since we would 
not be able to formulate the idea to do so for that reason ourselves, we 
could not act according to our conscience in that way). In fact, the sovereign 
may be blameworthy if she acts according to, 
P*: the sovereign is permitted not to tolerate such actions that actu-
 ally interfere with the stability of the society that meets standards S. 
 
The sovereign would be blameworthy if she does not actually believe 
that the actions interfere with the stability of a society that meets standards 
S. What matters in determining goodness is whether a person acts according 
to how they think they ought to act (according to their own conscience). 
But this might lead to the query about whether Bayle’s standard actu-
ally means anything substantive. For if the moral rule only consists in acting 
as you think you ought to act, why isn’t the ruler of our bad society entitled 
to act according to the stability of the bad society, provided he really and 
truly thinks it is best? And indeed, in some possible world, Bayle might agree 
that the ruler of a bad society might be permitted (or even obligated) to act 
according to what she thinks is best. However, this could be the case only if 
the ruler really did not have any information to the contrary, or was even 
aware of the possibility that there could be disagreement.66 
                                       
66 Compare Kilcullen 1988, 64-65. 
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While the sovereign is obligated to do as she thinks is right, how she 
gets to what she thinks is right provides normative constraints. In our world, 
the sovereign would hopefully realize that there are profound disagreements 
in religious and moral matters, not all of which are motivated by self-
interest, but some of which are motivated by honest perplexity.67 Indeed, 
Bayle’s writings could be seen as part of an effort to show that not all dis-
agreements about moral matters are motivated by self-interest or obstinacy. 
By writing about the different ways in which different peoples worship God, 
or follow the rules of morality, Bayle provides reasons to think that dis-
agreements about many moral matters may have their origins in principled 
reasoning, thus undermining the thesis that different ways of worshipping 
God are necessarily blasphemous. 68 The sovereign should also realize (un-
less there has been a systematic effort to keep her in the dark) that it is 
possible to be mistaken about moral beliefs, which implies that there needs 
to be an epistemological standard through which we determine which beliefs 
about what ought to be done are correct (or justifiable). The sovereign must 
also be aware of there being different countries and communities that do 
certain things differently, implying that the standards of the sovereign’s ac-
tual community are not the standard for everybody. This does not imply 
relativism; Bayle is committed to the idea that there are actual moral rules 
                                       
67 Compare Bayle 2005, 148. 
68 Compare Bayle 2005, 205. 
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(of which one is “follow your conscience”). But it does commit Bayle to 
fallibilism about moral knowledge: all of our moral beliefs could be mistaken. 
This set of considerations implies that a sovereign must also have be-
liefs that are not formed by obviously bad processes. For instance, if the 
sovereign forms her beliefs on the basis of some information gathering proc-
ess that she suspects are flawed, then she could not justifiably (at least ac-
cording to Bayle), act on those beliefs. But if the sovereign never comes 
across any information that puts in doubt her assessment about either a) 
what the stability of the ideal society would need or b) the method by which 
she formed her opinion, than she is not blameworthy for her actions, even if 
she is incorrect on the matter. Furthermore, if the sovereign is forced to act 
on belief A in a time of crisis, she is not blameworthy if she does not justify 
A, provided she has another belief which states that her taking the time to 
justify belief A would pose an unacceptable risk. 69 If, however, the sover-
eign deliberately limited her belief, or refused to investigate other possibili-
ties, she is blameworthy for her belief gathering process, and thus she can-
not be said to be acting according to her conscience. Her actions, according 
                                       
69 This is not unreasonable. To motivate this, suppose any trolley case and also suppose 
that it is permissible to let one person die to save five others. Any person acting on this be-
lief would not be blameworthy if they did not engage in an investigation about the relative 
moral worth of the five individuals on the other track vs. the one, even if it turns out that 
the one is Phillippa Foot, and the others turn out to be members of the Nazi Party. A key 
part of the blamelessness of the lack of investigation is that we believe we do not have time 
to investigate. For more on Trolley cases, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, "The Trolley Problem," 
The Yale Law Journal 94, no. 6 (May 1985): 1395-1415. 
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to Bayle, could no longer be considered even good, let alone right. 70 We 
should further amend principle A2 to read: 
 
A4: The sovereign is permitted to not tolerate (where toleration 
refers to Tb) such actions or creeds that she believes (when be-
lief meets standard B) would endanger the stability of the society 
that meets standard S, which may or may not be the same soci-
ety that the sovereign rules. 
 
B: A belief is acceptable as a principle for action when either a) 
the person holding the belief has encountered no reason to 
doubt the belief or the method by which she attained it, or b) 
has engaged in a good faith effort to justify the belief. 
 
S:  A society that fully protects, among other rights, the right of 
conscience. 
 
Tb: A principled refraining from imposing excessive costs and/or 
rewards on beliefs or actions, despite the beliefs or actions being 
thought objectionable. 
  
At this point, I have maintained Bayle’s central doctrine, in that the so-
vereign is not responsible for making sure his beliefs on the matter are true; 
but I have also shown there are significant limitations on the sort of beliefs 
that would actually past muster. In many cases, the sovereign would be re-
quired to justify the belief about what is tolerable or not or at least go try to 
establish a reliable method of justice for determining what may be just or 
not. While the sovereign who keeps this theory in mind may sometimes be 
                                       
70 This would rule out, as a matter of contingent fact, the goodness of tyrannical rulers not 
tolerating: they presumably (but not always) deliberately limited their belief gathering proc-
esses.   
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be mistaken about what the ideal society may require, the process of an-
swering principle A4 will hopefully generate answers that are stable and cor-
rect as far as what the ideal society would require.  
3.7 Conclusion to part three 
I have made the first steps towards identifying a Baylean principle of 
toleration. I have also successfully shown that Bayle’s theory concerning the 
limits of toleration can actually have normative force in terms of showing 
what we should tolerate, rather than just reaffirming the right of sovereigns 
to do whatever they wish. Thus, this Baylean principle of toleration has con-
ceptual bite, and is a viable competitor to other normative principles of tol-
eration, such as Mill’s Harm principle. However, whether the Baylean princi-
ple of toleration is better than its competitors remains an open question. 
4 Final Thoughts 
In part 2 of this paper, I gave an exposition of Bayle’s defense of relig-
ious toleration, giving an account of his general moral theory, its resem-
blance to that of Kant’s, and showing that Bayle’s defense remains compel-
ling even if we don’t believe in God. After giving the context, I then showed 
that one can derive a normative principle of toleration that has conceptual 
bite, though I have declined to show that the principle I have derived is su-
perior to any of the other competitors on the market. I hope that my work 
here will help further scholarship into Bayle’s theory of toleration. 
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